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Abstract
Many new exporters give up exporting very shortly, despite substantial entry costs; others
shoot up foreign sales and expand to new destinations. We develop a model based on exper-
imentation to rationalize these and other dynamic patterns of exporting firms. We posit that
individual export profitability, while initially uncertain, is positively correlated over time and
across destinations. This leads to “sequential exporting,” where the possibility of profitable
expansion at the intensive and extensive margins makes initial entry costs worthwhile despite
high failure rates. Firm-level evidence from Argentina’s customs, which would be diﬃcult to
reconcile with existing models, strongly supports this mechanism. Sequential exporting also
has important and novel policy implications: a reduction in trade barriers has delayed eﬀects,
while also promoting entry in third markets. This trade externality poses challenges for the
quantification of the eﬀects of trade liberalization programs and implies that the consequences
of international trade agreements are significantly richer than traditional models suggest.
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1 Introduction
How do firms break in foreign markets? To understand patterns of international trade and the
impact of trade liberalization, answering this question convincingly is of central importance. Recent
trade theories, starting with Melitz (2003), put great emphasis on the sunk costs firms have to incur
to start exporting, and existing estimates indicate that those costs are indeed likely to be high.1
Yet recent empirical research has uncovered patterns of foreign entry that seem diﬃcult to reconcile
with high sunk entry costs. For example, describing the behavior of Colombian firms, Eaton et
al. (2008) observe that many domestic firms enter foreign markets every year. They often start
selling small quantities to a single neighbor country, and yet almost half of them cease all exporting
activities in less than a year. Those who survive, on the other hand, tend to expand their presence
in their current destinations, and a sizeable fraction of the new exporters also expands to other
markets.
How can we explain so much entry activity with so little initial sales and so low survival
rates? After all, low sales within a short period likely imply negative profits, unless sunk costs are
implausibly small. And what could explain the seemingly sequential entry pattern of the surviving
exporters? We propose a simple model that rationalizes these recently uncovered empirical findings,
while also providing a number of additional empirical implications for the dynamic pattern of
exporting firms. The model relies on a basic premise: firms are initially uncertain about their
export profitability, but ex ante uncertain success factors are highly persistent and have global
scope. In other words, a firm’s export profitability is correlated over time within a market and also
across destinations. The global scope could reflect, for example, export-specific capabilities that, if
possessed, the firm could harness in multiple destinations.
If a firm’s export profit in a market is uncertain but correlated over time, entry allows the firm to
learn its profit potential there today and in the future. Furthermore, if the profitability uncovered
in that market provides information about the firm’s profitability in other foreign markets, this
too should be taken into account in the decision to start exporting. This can lead to a process of
“sequential exporting,” in which firms use their initial export experience to infer information on
their future success there and elsewhere. Like an option contract, the decision to start exporting
gives the firm the opportunity to, in some states of nature, enjoy profits in the future, there and
in other markets. In other states of nature, by contrast, there would not be any profit to be made
abroad. This reconciles first-market rapid growth and early expansion to other markets with high
initial failure rates, even in the presence of high irreversible entry costs.
Our model highlights a distinction that is often overlooked in empirical analyses of exporting
firms, namely whether a market is the firm’s first foreign market or not. Using firm-level data
1For example, Das et al. (2007) structurally estimate sunk entry costs for Colombian manufacturers of leather
products, knitted fabrics, and basic chemicals to be at least $344,000 in 1986 U.S. dollars. Morales et al. (2010) use
a diﬀerent approach but find similarly large magnitudes for chemical manufacturers from Chile.
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on all Argentine manufacturing exports between 2002 and 2007, we find strong evidence that this
diﬀerence is crucial. While firms behave diﬀerently in any market after having acquired some expe-
rience there, this diﬀerence is much more pronounced in a firm’s first foreign market. Specifically,
conditional on remaining an exporter, growth upon entry at both the intensive margin (the sales
in the market) and the extensive margin (the number of markets served) is significantly higher in
a firm’s first foreign market than in its subsequent markets. The same is true for exit: a firm is
more likely to exit from a foreign market right after entering it if that market is the firm’s first.
These results are not driven by firm heterogeneity, by country-specific shocks, by the possibility of
credit constraints, or by learning from rivals. Hence, while uncertainty correlated across time and
markets is but one possible force shaping firms’ export strategies, our evidence indicates that it
plays an unequivocal role. For brevity, we refer to the implications of this uncertainty for exporting
firms simply as “sequential exporting.”
Our model also implies that the diﬀerential eﬀect of the first market should not apply universally
to all exporters. For example, if the firm is re-starting to export after a break, there would no longer
be a fundamental uncertainty to be uncovered. Similarly, if a firm starts exporting by serving
multiple markets, it must be because it is rather confident about its export success, so on average
the role of self-discovery should not be as pronounced for such firms as it is for single-market
entrants. The uncertainty about export profitability should also be less marked for producers
of homogeneous goods, for which reference prices are available. Thus, our mechanism suggests
that we should observe rapid first-market export growth, early entry in additional markets and
frequent early first-market exit primarily among first-time, single-market exporters of diﬀerentiated
products. This is indeed what we find empirically.
We sought inspiration for the basic premise of our model in insights from the international
business literature, including recent findings on Argentine exporters by Artopoulos, Friel and Hallak
(2010). A long tradition in that literature, starting with Johanson and Vahlne (1977), emphasizes
the distinct knowledge and competencies–typically related to product adaptation, marketing and
distribution–that are required for export success. A firm can properly infer and develop its own
“internationalization knowledge,” however, only once it starts its foreign operations. Artopoulos,
Friel and Hallak (2010) document the importance of this export-specific knowledge with detailed
case study analyses of firms from four emerging export sectors in Argentina. Importantly, such
export capabilities can be used when accessing diﬀerent foreign destinations. A similar reasoning
applies to firm-specific demand characteristics. For example, trade facilitation agencies place a
heavy emphasis on the importance of uncovering foreign demand for would-be exporters, and
their advice indicates that the key uncertainty is about persistent demand components,2 some
of which can be present also in diﬀerent countries. We interpret these observations as suggestive of
2See for example the discussion of SITPRO, the British trade facilitation agency, at http://www.sitpro.org.uk.
See also Kee and Krishna (2008), who argue that market-, but also firm-specific demand shocks can help reconcile
the predictions of heterogeneous firms models with detailed micro evidence. Demidova et al. (2009) confirm this
when studying how variations in American and European trade policies vis-à-vis Bangladeshi apparel products aﬀect
firms’ choices of export destinations.
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significant firm-specific export profit uncertainty, which can be resolved only by actual engagement
in exporting, but which is informative of a firm’s general ability to earn profits in foreign markets.
The policy implications of the sequential exporting process are far-reaching. Consider the
impact of trade liberalization in diﬀerent countries for the firms of a “Home” country. When a
nearby country lowers its trade barriers, it attracts new exporting firms from Home. As these
new exporters learn about their ability to serve foreign markets, some fail and give up exporting,
whereas others are very successful and decide to expand to other foreign destinations. As a result,
trade liberalization in the nearby country promotes entry not only in that market but also in third
markets, albeit with a lag. Similarly, the reduction of trade barriers in a distant country, by raising
the value of an eventual entry there, also enhances the value of “export experimentation” in a
nearby market in the short run. Once some of the entrants realize a high export potential from
their experience in the neighbors’ markets, they move on to the market of the liberalizing country.
Thus, our findings suggest the existence of a trade externality : lower trade barriers in a country
induce entry of foreign firms in other markets. This could provide a motive for international coor-
dination of trade policies that is very diﬀerent from those often emphasized by trade economists.3
In this sense, our proposed mechanism enhances the rationale for global trade institutions such as
the World Trade Organization (WTO). If the trade externality were stronger at the regional level,
it could also help to explain the pattern of free trade agreements throughout the world.
In fact, the impact of trade agreements could be very distinct from what existing studies indicate.
For example, a regional trade agreement can boost export experimentation by lowering the costs
of accessing the markets of bloc partners. As a result of more experimentation, a greater number
of domestic firms would eventually find it profitable to export also to bloc outsiders. In that sense,
regional integration generates a type of “trade creation” that is very diﬀerent from the concept
economists often emphasize: in addition to promoting intra-bloc trade, a regional trading bloc can
also stimulate exports to non-member countries.4 If the agreement were of the multilateral type,
tracking down its eﬀects becomes even trickier. Indeed, third-country and lagged eﬀects of trade
liberalization may help to explain the diﬃculty in identifying significant trade eﬀects of multilateral
liberalization undertaken under the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade and the WTO (Rose
2004), which contrasts with well-entrenched beliefs that the GATT/WTO system has been crucial
in promoting international trade. Notice that although new exporters typically start small, they
tend to account for a large part of export growth (about 50% over ten years in the Colombian
sample of Eaton et al. 2008, for example), so that these eﬀects are potentially large.
The recent documentation of the pattern of firms’ foreign sales5 has been fostering a still incipi-
ent (see Redding 2011) but growing research interest on the dynamics of firms’ exporting strategies.6
3See Bagwell and Staiger (2002) for a general discussion of the motivations for international trade policy negotia-
tions.
4Borchert (2009) and Molina (2010) find that RTAs indeed promote exports to non-member countries at the
extensive margin, consistently with our theoretical mechanism.
5Buono et al. (2008) confirm some of the findings of Eaton et al. (2008) in a study of French firms. Lawless (2009)
carries out a related exercise for a survey of Irish exporters.
6Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia (2008) develop a model where potential exporters are uncertain about country-
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The current work of Eaton et al. (2009) and Freund and Pierola (2010), who emphasize learning
mechanisms, are the closest to ours. The former develop a model where producers learn about the
appeal of their products in a market by devoting resources to finding consumers and by observing
the experiences of competitors. Freund and Pierola also consider a single export market, but with
product-specific uncertainty, as their focus is on the incentives of firms to develop new products
for exporting. Using data on exports of non-traditional agricultural products in Peru, Freund and
Pierola uncover interesting patterns of trial and error based on the frequency of entry and exit
from foreign markets. In those models, uncertainty is destination-specific and the main goal is to
describe firms’ export dynamics within a market, without distinction between first and subsequent
markets. Here, in contrast, we take a multi-market approach. A central feature of our environment
concerns firms’ diﬀerent dynamics in their first and subsequent foreign markets, and the focus is
on the option value of a firm’s first export experience.
Our work is also related to other recent empirical findings at the product and country levels.
Evenett and Venables (2002) document a “geographic spread of exports” for 23 developing countries
between 1970 and 1997, in the sense that importing a product from a certain country is more likely if
the origin country is supplying the same product to nearby markets. Besedes and Prusa (2006) find
that the median duration of exporting a product to the United States is very short, with a hazard
rate that decreases sharply over time. Iacovone and Javorcik (2009) find that firms often undertake
significant investment before entering foreign markets, as a preparation for exporting. Alvarez et
al. (2008) find evidence from Chilean firms that exporting a product to a country increases the
likelihood of selling the same product to another foreign market. Bernard et al. (2009) show that
the extensive margins of US exports are key to explain variation at long intervals, but that the
intensive margin is responsible for most short-run (i.e. year-to-year) variation. These diﬀerent
contributions of the two margins over time reflect the fact that new exporters start small, but grow
fast and expand rapidly across destinations if they survive. Our model helps to rationalize these
findings as well.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our model. In
Section 3 we use Argentine customs data to test the distinguishing features of our theoretical
mechanism. In Section 4 we show the impact of trade liberalization under our mechanism and the
resulting policy implications. We conclude in Section 5.
specific fixed export costs, but learn about them from other firms in the industry that start exporting to the same
market. This idea is related to Hausmann and Rodrik’s (2003) earlier insight that ex ante unknown export opportu-
nities can be gauged from the experience of export pioneers, who eﬀectively provide a public good to the rest of the
industry. While those authors focus on learning from rivals, we are interested in individual self-discovery. Our work
is also related to dynamic export models with idiosyncratic uncertainty. Das et al. (2007) develop an heterogeneous
firm model where firm profitability evolves over time according to an exogenous stochastic process determining the
firm’s entry, exit and production decisions abroad. Arkolakis (2009) proposes a dynamic model with endogenous entry
costs that increase with the number of foreign consumers targeted. Eaton et al. (2010) integrate Arkolakis’ entry
cost structure in a model with diﬀerent types of firm-specific shocks. The model, which is static (and therefore does
not incorporate learning), is set up for studying the role of diﬀerent types of shocks in determining the geographical
pattern of French exports at the firm level.
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2 Model
We propose a model whose central assumption is the existence of a fundamental source of un-
certainty regarding firms’ general ability to earn profits abroad, and which can be resolved only
through experience in foreign markets.
A direct implication of our central assumption is that a firm’s export profitability should be
correlated over time and across destinations. Correlation over time can come from persistent but
ex ante unknown demand patterns, e.g. related to the appeal of certain product features. It
could also represent some idiosyncratic but ex ante unknown export costs that do not change
much over time. For example, shipping and other port activities, distribution of goods in foreign
markets, export finance and insurance, maintenance of an international division within the firm–
all these activities involve relatively stable idiosyncratic costs that are often unknown to the firm
until it actually engages into exporting. In turn, positive correlation across countries in export
profitability can come from similarities across countries either in demand or supply conditions. The
patterns uncovered by gravity equations–which show that bilateral trade correlates strongly with
indicators for common language, religion, colonial origin etc.–partly involve demand similarities
across countries. Likewise, some of the costs intrinsic to exporting, like those mentioned above,
while ex ante unknown for a firm, are often similar across countries.
This seems consistent with evidence from international business studies. These studies stress
the diﬀerent activities (and costs) that exporting requires. On the one hand, new exporters need to
learn about local consumer preferences, business practices and institutional environments. On the
other hand, they need to learn about how to establish appropriate routines and fine-tune the allo-
cation of resources to export activities. For example, in a review of international marketing studies,
Cavusgil and Zou (1994) list product adaptation, distributor support and commitment of manage-
rial resources to exports as key competencies required for a successful export strategy. Similarly,
in a study of several Argentine exporters during the 2000’s, Artopoulos, Friel and Hallak (2010)
find that export success entails substantial changes in product design, production and marketing
capabilities. Crucially, they also find that many new exporters were unaware of those changes prior
to exporting, presumably because of the tacit nature of that information. Successful exporters
are therefore those who are able to develop eﬀective export-specific processes and routines, which
Eriksson et al. (1997) refer to as a firm’s “internationalization knowledge.” Such knowledge, which
is obtained through export experience, aﬀects a firm’s perceived ability to enter new foreign markets
successfully, as they shape their capacity to acquire knowledge of institutions and business practices
in new markets. The need for new knowledge and competencies makes export success uncertain at
the time of entry, but also implies that the uncertainty is resolved through export experience. The
tacit nature of knowledge implies that there are no obvious substitutes to that experience.
Naturally, we do not suggest that firms do not face any producer-market specific uncertainty,
or that all uncertainty requires actual engagement in exporting to be resolved. Producers surely
acquire formal knowledge and observe other exporters prior to their foreign entry decision. We
focus on the residual uncertainty because it has not been explored yet in this context, but has
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potentially large and important implications.
2.1 Basic structure
A risk-neutral producer has the option of serving two segmented foreign markets, A and B. Coun-
tries A and B are symmetric except for the unit trade costs that the Home firm must pay to export
there, denoted by τA and τB, τA ≤ τB. To sell in each foreign market, the firm needs to incur
in a one-time fixed cost per destination, F ≥ 0. This corresponds to the costs of establishing
distribution channels, of designing a marketing strategy, of learning about exporting procedures,
of familiarization with the institutional and policy characteristics of the foreign country, etc.
Variable costs comprise two elements: an unknown export unit cost, cj , and a unit production
cost that is known to the firm. We normalize the latter to zero. In Section 2.3 we show that
allowing for diﬀerences in productivity has no qualitative consequence for our main mechanism.
The producer faces the following demand in each market j = A,B:
qj(pj) = dj − pj , (1)
where qj denotes the output sold in destination j, pj denotes the corresponding price, and dj is an
unknown parameter.
We therefore allow for uncertainty in both demand and supply parameters. Let
μj ≡ dj − cj
be a random variable with a continuous cumulative distribution function G(·) on the support [μ, μ].
We refer to μj as the firm’s “export profitability” in market j. μ obtains when the highest possible
demand intercept (d) and the lowest possible export unit cost (c) are realized; μ obtains under
the opposite extreme scenario (dj = d and cj = c). The analysis becomes interesting when trade
costs are such that, upon the resolution of the uncertainty, it may become optimal to serve both,
only one, or none of the markets. Accordingly, we assume μ < τA–so that exporting may not be
worthwhile even if F = 0–and 2F 1/2 + τB < μ. This last condition implies that exporting to the
distant market can be profitable. To ensure that equilibrium prices are always strictly positive, we
need that Eμ < 2dj for all dj , so we assume throughout the paper that d > 12Eμ.
7
Our central assumption is that export profitability is correlated over time and across markets.
This correlation could come from either supply or demand components of uncertainty in the para-
meter μ, as suggested by our discussion above. To make the analysis as clear and simple as possible,
we focus on the limiting case. First, as the definition of μj without time subscripts indicates, we
consider that the μj ’s are constant over time. Second, we look at the case where the draws of μj
are perfectly correlated across markets: μA = μB = μ. Each of these assumptions can be relaxed;
all of our qualitative results generalize to any strictly positive correlation of export profitabilities
7 If we adopted instead a demand function of the form qj(pj) = max

dj − pj , 0

, our results would remain unaf-
fected. We develop this case in http://www.economics.soton.ac.uk/staﬀ/calvo/documents/Technical_Addendum_2.pdf.
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across markets and over time.8
To model the decision to enter foreign markets, we evaluate all profits from an ex ante perspec-
tive, i.e. at their t = 0 expected value. For simplicity we do not consider a discount factor, but
this has no bearing on our qualitative results. We denote by ejt the firm’s decision to enter market
j at time t, j = A,B, t = 1, 2. Thus, ejt = 1 if the firm enters market j (i.e. pays the sunk cost) at
t, ejt = 0 otherwise. Output q
j
t can be strictly positive only if either e
j
t = 1 or e
j
t−1 = 1.
The timing is as follows:
t = 1: At period 1, the firm decides whether to enter each market. If the firm decides to enter market
j, it pays the per-destination fixed entry cost F and chooses how much to sell there in that
period, qj1. At the end of period 1, export profits in destination j are realized. If the firm has
entered and produced qj1 ≥ ε, where ε > 0 is arbitrarily small, it infers μ from its profit.
t = 2: At period 2, if the firm has entered market j at t = 1, it decides whether to keep serving on
that market given the realization of export profits. If so, it chooses how much to sell in that
market, qj2. If the firm has not entered destination j at t = 1, it decides whether to enter that
market. If the firm enters, it pays F and chooses qj2. At the end of period 2, export profits
are realized.
Hence, the firm can infer its export profitability parameter μ only by actually engaging in
exporting, which requires the firm to pay the fixed entry cost F and sell a strictly positive quantity
to one of the markets. This is reminiscent of Jovanovic’s (1982) model, although a central diﬀerence
is that we consider entry into several destinations. Clearly, uncovering μ must be costly, or else
every firm would, counterfactually, export at least a tiny quantity to gather their export potential.
We model this cost as a sunk cost, but this is not necessary for our results. Alternatively, one could
specify that a firm needs a minimum scale of experimentation to reliably uncover its true export
profitability. We allow this minimum scale to be an arbitrarily small number (ε) because we require
the firm to spend F to sell in a foreign market, but one could for example assume the opposite (i.e.
set F = 0 and require a larger minimum scale).9
In reality, entry may also be “passive,” where a foreign buyer posts an order and the exporting
firm simply delivers it. Trade in intermediate goods, for example, is indeed often importer-driven,
rather than exporter-driven. Thus, in general firms may either deliberately choose to enter a
market, or simply wait until they are “found” by a foreign buyer. While our model focuses on the
former type of entry, a passive first export experience could also resolve uncertainty and lead to
active expansion on foreign markets. Our empirical findings certainly involve both types of first
export experiences.
8We show this for the case where the μj ’s are positively but imperfectly correlated in Appendix B
of a previous working paper version of the paper, Albornoz et al. (2010), with additional details in
http://www.economics.soton.ac.uk/staﬀ/calvo/documents/Technical_Addendum_1.pdf.
9More general forms of experimentation are compatible with our main mechanism. For example, Akhmetova and
Mitaritonna (2010) develop a model of entry in foreign markets where demand uncertainty takes time to be unveiled,
as in Aghion et al. (1991). As a result, producers also need to decide their levels of experimentation.
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2.2 Firm’s export decision
There are three undominated entry strategies. The firm may enter both markets simultaneously
at t = 1 (“simultaneous entry”); enter only market A at t = 1, deciding at t = 2 whether to enter
market B (“sequential entry”); or enter neither market. The other two possibilities, of entering
both markets only at t = 2 and of entering market B before market A, need not be considered.
The latter is dominated by entering market A before market B, since τA ≤ τB. The former is
dominated by simultaneous entry at t = 1, since by postponing entry the producer is faced with
the same problem as in t = 1, but is left with a shorter horizon to recoup identical fixed entry costs.
We solve for the firm’s decision variables {ej1, ej2, qj1, qj2} using backward induction. We denote
optimal quantities in period t under simultaneous entry by bqjt , and under sequential entry by eqjt .
2.2.1 Period t = 2
i) No entry. The firm does not export, earning zero profit.
ii) Simultaneous entry. When the firm exports to both destinations at t = 1, at t = 2 it will
have inferred its export profitability μ and will choose its export volumes by solving
max
qj2≥0
n
(μ− τ j − qj2)q
j
2
o
, j = A,B.
This yields bqj2(τ j) = 1{μ>τj}µμ− τ j2
¶
, (2)
where 1{.} represents the indicator function, here denoting whether μ > τ j . Second-period output
is zero for low μ. Profits at t = 2, expressed in t = 0 expected terms, can then be written as
V (τ j) =
Z μ
τj
µ
μ− τ j
2
¶2
dG(μ), j = A,B.
V (τ j) is the value of continuing to export to market j after profitability in foreign markets has
been discovered. If the firm cannot deliver positive profits in a market, it exits to avoid further
losses. Otherwise, the firm tunes up its output choice to that market.
iii) Sequential entry. When the firm exports to country A in t = 1, at t = 2 it will have inferred
its export profitability μ. Thus, qA2 is again given by (2): eqA2 (τA) = bqA2 (τA) = 1{μ>τA} ³μ−τA2 ´,
generating second-period profit V (τA). Otherwise, if the firm cannot deliver positive profits in a
market it exits market A to avoid further losses.
The firm chooses to enter market B at t = 2 if the operational profit is greater than the sunk
cost to enter that market. This will be the case when the firm realizes its export profitability is
large relative to the sunk cost: µ
μ− τB
2
¶2
≥ F . (3)
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Hence, the firm’s entry decision in market B at t = 2 is
eB2 (τ
B) = 1⇔ μ ≥ 2F 1/2 + τB. (4)
Thus, defining FB2 (τ
B) as the F that solves (3) with equality, the firm enters market B at t = 2 if
F ≤ FB2 (τB). It is straightforward to see that FB2 (τB) is strictly decreasing in τB.
If the firm enters market B, it will choose qB2 much like it chooses q
A
2 , adjusted for market B’s
specific trade cost, τB. However, conditional on eB2 = 1, we know that μ > τ
B. Therefore, the firm
sets eqB2 (τB) = μ−τB2 .
Expressed in t = 0 expected terms, the firm’s profit from (possibly) entering market B at t = 2
corresponds to
W (τB;F ) ≡
Z μ
2F 1/2+τB
"µ
μ− τB
2
¶2
− F
#
dG(μ)
=
(
V (τB)−
Z 2F 1/2+τB
τB
µ
μ− τB
2
¶2
dG(μ)
)
− F
h
1−G(2F 1/2 + τB)
i
.
Function W (τB;F ) represents the value of exporting to market B after learning its profitability
in foreign markets by entering market A first. The expression in curly brackets represents the (ex
ante) expected gross profit from entering market B at t = 2. The other term represents the fixed
cost from entering B times the probability that entry in that market is profitable.
Thus, the return from first entering destination A includes the value of waiting to subsequently
become an informed exporter to destination B, avoiding the costs from directly “testing” that
market. In the presence of uncertainty and the irreversible entry cost F , the possibility of delaying
entry into market B corresponds to a real option. If profits were not correlated across destinations,
there would not be any gain from delaying entry into B and W (τB;F ) would collapse to the
unconditional expectation of profits in market B, as in t = 1. The diﬀerence between these two
values, which is the value of the real option, would then be zero. While we focus on the case of
perfect correlation, it should be clear that as long as the correlation is positive, the value of the
option remains strictly positive.
2.2.2 Period t = 1
i) No entry. The firm does not export, earning zero profit.
ii) Simultaneous entry. A firm exporting to both destinations at t = 1 chooses qA1 and q
B
1 to
maximize gross profits:
ΨSm(qA1 , q
B
1 ; τ
A, τB) ≡
Z μ
μ
(μ− τA − qA1 )qA1 dG(μ) +
Z μ
μ
(μ− τB − qB1 )qB1 dG(μ)
+max
n
1{qA1 >0},1{qB1 >0}
o £
V (τA) + V (τB)
¤
, (5)
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where superscript Sm stands for “simultaneous” entry. The first two terms correspond to the firm’s
period 1 per-destination operational profits. The third term denotes how much the firm expects
to earn in period 2, depending on whether either qA1 > 0 or q
B
1 > 0. Since exporting to one
market reveals information about the firm’s export profitability in both markets, it is enough to
have exported a positive amount in period 1 to either destination.
Maximization of (5) yields outputs
bqA1 (τA) = 1{Eμ>τA}µEμ− τA2
¶
+ 1{Eμ≤τA}ε, (6)
bqB1 (τB) = 1{Eμ>τB}µEμ− τB2
¶
, (7)
where ε > 0 is an arbitrarily small number. To understand these expressions, notice that there
are three possibilities that depend on parameter values. If Eμ > τB, qj1 =
Eμ−τj
2 for j = A,B is
clearly optimal. If τB ≥ Eμ > τA, qA1 = Eμ−τ
A
2 and q
B
1 = 0 is the best choice. If Eμ ≤ τA, setting
qA1 = q
B
1 = 0 may appear optimal. However, inspection of (5) makes clear that a small but strictly
positive qA1 = ε > 0 dominates that option, since limε→0Ψ
Sm(ε, 0; τA, τB) = V (τA) + V (τB) > 0.
Clearly, setting qA1 = q
B
1 = 0 forgoes the benefit from uncovering a valuable signal of the firm’s
export profitability.
Define Ψ(τ j) ≡ 1{Eμ>τj}
³
Eμ−τj
2
´2
+ V (τ j). Evaluating (5) at the optimal output choices (6),
(7) and (2), we obtain the firm’s expected gross profit from simultaneous entry:
ΨSm(τA, τB) ≡ lim
ε→0+
ΨSm(bqA1 (τA), bqB1 (τB); τA, τB) = Ψ(τA) +Ψ(τB). (8)
iii) Sequential entry. At t = 1, a firm that enters only market A chooses qA1 to maximize
ΨSq(qA1 ; τ
A, τB) ≡
Z μ
μ
(μ− τA − qA1 )qA1 dG(μ) + 1{qA1 >0}
£
V (τA) +W (τB;F )
¤
, (9)
where Sq stands for “sequential” entry. The firm learns its export profitability iﬀ qA1 > 0. A strictly
positive quantity allows the firm to make a more informed entry decision in market B at t = 2,
according to (4). Clearly, the solution to this program is eqA1 (τA) = bqA1 (τA), as in (6). Evaluating
(9) at the optimal output choice eqA1 (τA), we obtain the firm’s expected profit from sequential entry:
ΨSq(τA, τB) ≡ lim
ε→0+
ΨSq(eqA1 (τA); τA, τB) = Ψ(τA) +W (τB;F ). (10)
We therefore have that some firms will “test” foreign markets before fully exploring them (or
exiting them altogether). Interestingly, experimentation can arise even when the variable trade cost
is large enough to render period-1 expected operational profits negative in all markets, and despite
the existence of sunk costs to export. Intuitively, the firm can choose to incur the sunk cost and a
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Figure 1: The Profit Function from Sequential Exporting when Eμ < τA
small initial operational loss because it might be competitive in that foreign market as well as in
others; the return from the initial sale allows the firm to find out whether it actually is.
Figure 1 illustrates this point by showing a situation where export experimentation is worth-
while even though Eμ < τA. The lowest curve represents the profit of entering market A when
experimentation is useless. The middle curve adds the value of experimentation in the entry mar-
ket; the highest curve includes also the value of experimentation across markets. In this example,
experimentation is worthy only because success in A is informative about success in B; other-
wise the value of information would not be high enough to compensate for the sunk costs [i.e.,
V (τA) +W (τB;F ) > F > V (τA)].
2.2.3 Entry strategy
We can now fully characterize the firm’s entry strategy. Using (8), the firm’s net profit from
simultaneous entry, ΠSm, is
ΠSm = Ψ(τA) +Ψ(τB)− 2F . (11)
In turn, we have from (10) that the firm’s net profit from sequential entry, ΠSq, is
ΠSq = Ψ(τA) +W (τB;F )− F . (12)
Simultaneous entry is optimal if ΠSm > ΠSq and ΠSm ≥ 0. Conversely, sequential entry is
optimal if ΠSq ≥ ΠSm and ΠSq ≥ 0. If neither set of conditions is satisfied, the firm does not enter
any market. Using (11) and (12), we can rewrite these conditions as follows. Simultaneous entry
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is optimal if (
F < Ψ(τB)−W (τB;F ) and
F ≤
£
Ψ(τA) +Ψ(τB)
¤
/2.
Notice that the right-hand side of the second inequality above is strictly greater than the right-
hand side of the first inequality, since W (τB;F ) > 0, Ψ(.) is a decreasing function and τA ≤ τB.
Intuitively, if F is small enough to make simultaneous entry preferred to sequential entry, it also
makes simultaneous entry preferred to no entry at all. Thus, simultaneous entry is optimal if
F < Ψ(τB)−W (τB;F ). (13)
In turn, sequential entry is optimal if
Ψ(τB)−W (τB;F ) ≤ F ≤ Ψ(τA) +W (τB;F ). (14)
Inequalities (13) and (14) define the firm’s entry strategy at t = 1. The firm enters market A
at t = 1 if either (13) or (14) are satisfied; it enters market B at t = 1 if (13) is satisfied but (14)
is not:
eA1 (τ
A, τB) = 1⇔ F ≤ Ψ(τA) +W (τB;F ), (15)
eB1 (τ
B) = 1⇔ F < Ψ(τB)−W (τB;F ). (16)
Naturally, the condition for eB1 = 1 is stricter than the condition for e
A
1 = 1. Condition (16) implies
that eB1 = 1 (in which case simultaneous entry occurs) only if the sunk cost to export is suﬃciently
small. The following proposition shows this and other results that fully characterize the firm’s
export decision. See Appendix A for all proofs.
Proposition 1 There are numbers FSq and FSm, with FSq > FSm ≥ 0, such that at t = 1 the
firm enters both markets A and B if F < FSm, enters only market A if F ∈ [FSm, FSq], and enters
neither market if F > FSq. Moreover, FSm > 0 iﬀ Eμ > τB. When F ∈ [FSm, FSq], at t = 2 the
firm enters market B if it learns that condition (4) is satisfied.
The intuition for these results is simple. By construction τA ≤ τB, so if the firm ever enters any
foreign market, it will enter market A. Since there are gains from resolving the uncertainty about
export profitability, entry in market A, if it happens, will take place in the first period. Provided
that the firm enters country A, it can also enter country B in the first period or wait to learn its
export profitability before going to market B. If the firm enters market B at t = 1, it earns the
expected operational profit in that market in the first period. Naturally, this can make sense only
when the operational profit in B is expected to be positive (Eμ > τB). By postponing entry the
firm forgoes that profit but saves the sunk entry cost if it realizes that its export profitability is not
suﬃciently high. The size of the sunk cost has no bearing on the former, but increases the latter.
Hence, the higher the sunk cost to export, the more beneficial is waiting before sinking F in the
less profitable market, B.
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Figure 2: Optimal Entry Strategy (Eμ > τB)
Figure 2 illustrates this result when Eμ > τB, in which case simultaneous entry is optimal for
small enough F . Notice that trade cost τB aﬀects both thresholds, while trade cost τA only aﬀects
FSq. Thus, we can denote the thresholds as FSq(τA, τB) and FSm(τB). We characterize how trade
costs aﬀect each of the thresholds in Section 4.
2.3 Diﬀerences in productivity
We have developed the analysis so far without mentioning how diﬀerences in productivity would
aﬀect our results. Yet the large and growing literature spurred by Melitz (2003) emphasizes that
productivity diﬀerences are key to explain firms’ export behavior. As we now show, they matter in
our analysis too, not disrupting but rather reinforcing our mechanism.
To allow for diﬀerences in productivity, define a firm’s unit costs as 1ϕ + c, where ϕ ∈ [0,∞)
denotes the firm’s (known) eﬃciency in production (i.e. its measure of productivity) and c again
reflects its (unknown) unit export cost. It is easy to see, for example, that more productive firms
will sell larger quantities (and expect higher profits) in the destinations they serve. More important
for our purposes is how diﬀerences in productivity aﬀect entry patterns in foreign markets. The
following proposition shows that the more productive a firm is, the less stringent the start-up fixed
entry thresholds FSq and FSm become.
Proposition 2 FSq and FSm are increasing in productivity ϕ.
Figure 3 illustrates Proposition 2. If productivity is too low (ϕ < 1μ−τA ), there is no hope
of making profits through exporting, and therefore the firm does not enter any foreign market
even if F = 0. Similarly, the firm would never enter simultaneously if it did not expect to make
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Figure 3: Optimal Entry Strategy with Varying Productivity
positive operational profits in market B (i.e. if ϕ > 1Eμ−τB ). By contrast, observe that as the unit
production cost falls to zero (i.e. ϕ→∞), the thresholds approach those defined in Proposition 1.
Thus, varying productivity levels shift the thresholds defining sequential and simultaneous entry
in foreign markets in an unambiguous way. Higher productivity increases the expected profits from
entering foreign markets simultaneously, as well as the expected profits from exporting at all. The
entry strategies can therefore still be characterized by the sunk cost thresholds. The only diﬀerence
is that the more productive a firm is, the higher its sunk cost thresholds will be, implying that
more productive firms are more likely to export, and to start exporting simultaneously to multiple
destinations. Hence productivity diﬀerences and self-discovery forces interact to determine export
dynamics, complementing each other.
2.4 Testable implications
Our model is parsimonious in many dimensions. For example, we assume that firms learn fully
about their profitability in foreign market j by selling at market i, i 6= j. In reality, the correlation
of export profitabilities across markets is surely less than perfect. However, if it is not negligible,
the main messages of the model remain intact (we show this formally in Albornoz et al. 2010). The
same is true about correlation of export profitabilities in a given market over time. Eﬀectively, our
running hypothesis is that firms extract the highest informational content from their first export
experience. The implications of the model should be interpreted accordingly. Similarly, to derive
explicit testable predictions, one would need to extend the model to T > 2 periods and N > 2
foreign countries (as we also do in Albornoz et al. 2010). Since this is rather straightforward, here
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we discuss only informally how they follow from our setup.
The model implies, first, that conditional on survival we should expect faster intensive margin
export growth when firms are learning their export profitabilities–i.e. right after they enter their
first foreign market. The reason is simple. Since export profitability is uncertain for a firm before
it starts exporting, first-year exports are on average relatively low. If the firm anticipates positive
variable profit in its first market, it produces according to this expectation. If the firm stays there
in the second period, it must be because its uncovered export potential is indeed relatively high
(μ > τA). Since the relevant distribution of μ becomes a truncation of the original one, conditional
on survival firms on average expand sales in their first market. If the firm had entered that
market just to learn about its export potential there (and to potentially benefit from expanding
to other destinations in the future), the firm initially produces just the minimum necessary for
eﬀective learning and the same argument applies even more strongly. On the other hand, once the
uncertainty about export profitability has been resolved, there is no reason for further changes in
sales, and there should be no growth in export volumes in the years following this discovery period.
Similarly, since the profitability of the firm in its first export destination conveys all information
about export profitability in other destinations, there is no reason for export growth in markets
other than the firm’s first either.
Obviously, our model delivers these results too bluntly. It abstracts from a range of shocks
that are likely to aﬀect the firm’s output choices and growth; we seek to control for those in our
empirical analysis. There are also other reasons to expect export growth in new foreign markets,
which we discuss later. Moreover, while we assume that export profitability is perfectly correlated
across markets and time, that assumption is clearly too strong. In particular, export profitability
that is imperfectly correlated across markets implies strictly positive first-to-second year export
growth in every market the firm expands to and survives. The hypothesis we test, instead, is that
firms learn more about their export profitabilities in their first markets, so the early expansion of
surviving firms is greater in their initial markets than in their subsequent markets.
The second implication of the model relates to entry patterns. Once a firm starts exporting, it
will uncover its export profitability. Some new exporters will realize that their export profitabilities
are suﬃciently high and decide to expand in the next period to other markets where they anticipate
positive profits. By contrast, experienced exporters have already learnt enough about their export
profitability, and therefore have already made their entry decisions in the past.
Again, the message from our basic model is extreme, as it abstracts from all other motives for
expansion to diﬀerent foreign markets–which we seek to control for in our empirical analysis. But
it helps to highlight our central point, that (surviving) new exporters have an additional motivation
for expansion.
The third implication of the model refers to the exit patterns of exporting firms. Because an
experienced exporter is better informed about its own export profitability than a new exporter,
the latter is more likely than the former to find out that it is not worthwhile to keep serving a
market. Critically, the model implies that this is also true when comparing firms that have just
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entered a given foreign destination, but when this is the first foreign market for one firm and not
for the other. Generally, while many (un-modeled) factors can cause a firm to abandon a foreign
destination, the model shows that being a new exporter creates an additional motivation to do so,
in expected terms.
The model also has implications for the dynamic behavior of diﬀerent types of exporters. First,
it implies that the behavior of simultaneous exporters–firms that start exporting to more than
one destination–should be diﬀerent from the behavior of the (more prevalent) strict sequential
exporters. The model indicates that, if a firm is willing to pay the sunk costs to start its foreign
operations in multiple markets simultaneously, it must be because it is rather optimistic about its
export profitability (i.e. Eμ must be large relative to τB and to F ). This implies less volatility (i.e.
exiting less frequently and expanding less vigorously) in the behavior of simultaneous exporters
relative to the firms that break in a single foreign destination.
Second, some seemingly new exporters are actually re-entrants. These are the firms that did not
export at t− 1 but did so before t− 1 and exported again at t. While the model does not explain
the behavior of re-entrant exporters, a simple extension that allows for firm-country temporary
shocks would readily do so. But if self-discovery is indeed an important force shaping the dynamic
behavior of firms in foreign markets (and barring problems with “short memory”), the eﬀect of
being “new” should not be as strong for returning exporters upon re-entry as it is for (“true”) new
exporters, since they already have a reliable signal of (the permanent component of) their export
profitabilities.
Third, uncertainty about producer-specific export profitability is likely to be greater for diﬀer-
entiated products than for homogeneous goods, which tend to have a well-defined reference price
and whose export procedures are likely to be more standardized. Accordingly, the distinction be-
tween the behavior of new and old exporters should be more pronounced for the foreign sales of
diﬀerentiated products than of homogeneous goods.
3 Evidence
We now test the predictions of the model. We start by briefly describing the data.
3.1 Data
Our data comes from the Argentine Customs Oﬃce. We observe the annual value (in US dollars) of
the foreign sales of each Argentine manufacturing exporter between 2002 and 2007, distinguished
by country of destination. Over our sample period, Argentine manufacturing exports involved
15,301 exporters and 130 foreign destinations. Among new exporters, 79% of new exporters start
in a single market, 15% enter initially in two or three foreign countries, and 6% start with more
than three destinations. On average, exporting firms serve three distinct foreign markets, although
around 40% of the exporting firms serve only one market outside Argentina.
Appendix B presents the trends of aggregate exports in Argentina during 2002-2007, as well
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as annual exports by sector and by destination. As we show there, new exporters are markedly
diﬀerent from experienced exporters. Such diﬀerences are not specific to Argentina; in fact, they
echo the regularities observed by other authors in diﬀerent countries (e.g. Eaton et al. 2008 in
Colombia, Buono et al. 2008 in France, Lawless 2009 in Ireland). However, those authors do not
distinguish between the behavior of exporters in their first and their subsequent foreign markets.
As Table 1 illustrates, this distinction is very important.
Table 1: Firm-level export growth, First Market versus New Market
Year First Market 2003 Second Market 2004 New Market 2003
USD Growth (%) USD Growth (%) USD Growth (%)
2003 35465 96541
2004 102718 190 33831 200799 108
2005 139439 36 69100 104 304295 52
2006 163864 18 87036 26 340015 12
2007 216865 32 95835 10 449147 32
Table 1 reports the foreign sales of firms that break into a new market in 2003 and keep exporting
there in the subsequent years of our data set.10 We distinguish those exporting in 2003 for the first
time (“First Market 2003”) from those already exporting elsewhere (“New Market 2003”). To keep
the comparison focused, we also look at the sales of the firms from the first group that expand to
other markets in 2004 (“Second Market 2004”). The table displays each group’s average export
value by year. The average firm from all groups increases exports in every period, especially from
its first to its second year in a market. Yet the feature of the table that really stands out is the
markedly higher initial growth of the new exporters in their first market (190%), relative both to
the initial growth of experienced exporters entering new markets (108%) and to the initial growth
of the same firms but in the markets they enter later (104%). As we will show, this distinction is
also important at the extensive margin, and remains very salient in the data after controlling for
firm heterogeneity, country-year specific shocks and other eﬀects.
3.2 Intensive margin export growth
Our model predicts that, conditional on survival, the growth of a firm’s exports is on average
highest early in its first foreign market:
Prediction 1 Conditional on survival, the growth rate of exports to a market is on average higher
between the first and second periods in the first foreign market served by the firm than in subsequent
markets or later in the firm’s first market.
10We focus on 2003 to obtain the longest possible time span after entry.
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We test this prediction by estimating the following equation:
∆ logXijt = α1 (FYij,t−1 × FMij) + α2FMij + α3FYij,t−1 + {FE}+ uijt,
where ∆ logXijt is the growth rate of the value of exports between t and t− 1 by firm i in market
j, FYij,t−1 is a dummy indicating whether firm i exported to destination j in t − 1 for the first
time, and FMij indicates whether j is the firm’s first export market. Prediction 1 indicates that
α1 > 0. Parameter α1 indicates whether the growth of continuing exporters is diﬀerent for fledgling
exporters. We also include FM and FY by themselves, because there could be other reasons that
make growth distinct in the first export market of a firm or in the firm’s first periods of activity in
a foreign market, respectively.
Of course, many other factors aﬀect a firm’s export growth in a market, such as the general
characteristics of the destination country, the economic conditions in the year, and the firm’s own
distinguishing characteristics. To account for those factors, we include a wide range of fixed eﬀects,
indicated by {FE}, including year, destination–or alternatively, year-destination–and firm fixed
eﬀects. Firm fixed eﬀects control for all systematic diﬀerences across firms that do not change over
time and aﬀect export growth (firm-specific export growth trends). Year-destination fixed eﬀects
control for all aggregate shocks that aﬀect the general attractiveness of a market–aggregate demand
growth, exchange rate variations, political changes etc. In these and all subsequent regressions, our
standard errors allow for clusters in firms.
Importantly, the sample used in this regression consists of firms that exported for at least two
consecutive years to a destination–i.e. firms that survive more than a year in a foreign market–
and all results are conditional on survival. Thus, selection is not an issue here.
Table 2 displays the results. Results with diﬀerent sets of fixed eﬀects are presented in columns
1-4. Coeﬃcients for FMij and FYij,t−1 suggest that growth is not in general higher in firms’ first
market, but it is so in their early periods of activity in a market. This could reflect market-specific
uncertainty (as in Eaton et al. 2009 and Freund and Pierola 2010), or perhaps the dynamics of
trust in business relationships.11 It also reflects a simple accounting phenomenon: since firms enter
markets over the year, initial exports appear artificially low in the first year whenever the data are
on an annual basis, as here.
Our central finding is that the coeﬃcient associated with the interaction FYij,t−1 × FMij is
positive and significant in all specifications that include firm fixed eﬀects.12 Being a new exporter
is associated with higher growth over and above the growth of firms in their first year of serving a
particular market, or in their initial market. This additional growth component can be explained
11Rauch and Watson (2003) argue that exporters to a market “start small” and are only able to expand once their
foreign partners are convinced of their reliability. Araujo and Ornelas (2007) point out that evolving trust levels
within partnerships substitute for weak cross-border contract enforcement, implying that trade volumes increase over
time, conditional on survival.
12The insignificant coeﬃcient in the regression without firm fixed eﬀects simply reveals the degree of firm hetero-
geneity in our sample. It indicates that firms that have high initial growth tend to enter more markets, washing out
the diﬀerential first-market eﬀect when the firms’ average export growth is not accounted for.
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Table 2: Intensive Margin Growth (Dependent Variable: ∆ logXijt)
OLS 1 2 3 4 5 6
FYij,t−1 × FMij -.032 .141** .098** .095** .165** .171**
(.028) (.036) (.036) (.036) (.057) (.036)
FMij .025 -.013 -.009 -.008 -.034 -.069*
(.018) (.038) (.039) (.038) (.06) (.036)
FYij,t−1 .263** .238** .233** .233** .242** .237**
(.014) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.025) (.016)
logXi,t−1 -.001**
(.0001)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes
Destination FE yes
Year-Destination FE yes yes yes
Credit-constrained sectors no
Number of obs 107390 107390 107390 107390 43258 107390
R-squared .01 .09 .10 .10 .10 .10
**: significant at 1%; *: significant at 5%
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
neither by market-specific uncertainty nor by the above mentioned accounting phenomenon (which
applies equally to all markets in a firm’s export history).
The eﬀect of being a new exporter on intensive-margin growth is economically sizeable, too.
Unconditional intensive-margin growth in our sample is 20%. However, average growth is about 23
percentage points higher in a firm’s initial period of activity in a market, and this eﬀect jumps to
33 percentage points if the market is the firm’s first.
It is plausible that this result may be driven by credit constraints, which are likely to aﬀect new
exporters more than experienced exporters, since the latter tend to have access to greater retained
earnings. To account for the role of credit constraints, we would ideally use credit constraint
information at the firm level. Since that information is unavailable to us, we borrow Manova’s
(2008) measure of ‘asset tangibility’ to identify the industries that are least credit constrained,
i.e. those that have the highest proportion of collateralizable assets. We then define an industry
to be relatively credit unconstrained if the value of asset tangibility for the industry is above the
median for the whole manufacturing sector (i.e. 30%), and examine whether results are significantly
diﬀerent in the subsample of credit unconstrained firms. Column 5 shows the results. The coeﬃcient
on FYij,t−1×FMij remains highly significant and is in fact larger, suggesting that credit constraints
actually limit the magnitude of the early expansion of new exporters in their first markets.
A common view in the literature is that firms start exporting after experiencing positive persis-
tent idiosyncratic productivity shocks (e.g. Arkolakis 2009, Irrarazabal and Opromolla 2008). Due
to serial correlation, growth in exports fades over time as shocks die out. This could explain why
early export growth is highest in the first market. A way to partially control for this eﬀect is to
include the firm’s lagged aggregate export level (in millions). Column 6 shows that, when doing so,
the eﬀect of FYij,t−1 × FMij on export growth remains positive and significant. It is also consid-
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erably higher than in the equivalent specification without the control for lagged exports (column
4). Furthermore, summing the coeﬃcients of FYij,t−1 × FMij , FYij,t−1 and FMij in columns 4
and 6, we find that the growth diﬀerential between old and new exporters is hardly aﬀected by size
controls (about 33 percentage points in both cases).
3.3 Entry
Our model also predicts that new exporters are more likely to enter new foreign destinations:
Prediction 2 Conditional on survival, new exporters are more likely to enter other foreign markets
than experienced ones.
To test this prediction, we create for every firm i exporting to some destination s other than
r at period t − 1, a binary variable Entryirt that takes value one if firm i enters destination r at
time t, and zero otherwise. Therefore non-entry corresponds to the choice by an exporting firm i
to not enter destination r at time t, although it might do so in the future. When Entryirt = 1,
that firm-destination pair ir leaves the sample from t+1 onwards. The sample consists of all firms
that export for at least 2 years.
Since entry in a specific country in a specific year is a rather rare event for any firm, we group
countries in nine relatively homogenous regions to make the analysis more meaningful: Mercosur,
Chile-Bolivia (Argentina’s neighbors that are not full Mercosur members), Other South Amer-
ica, Central America-Mexico, North America, Spain-Italy (Argentina’s main historical migration
sources), EU-27 except Spain-Italy, China, and Rest of the World.13 As we discuss below, we obtain
equivalent results when using the total number of national markets served by a firm.
We thus run the following regression on the probability of starting to export to a new market:
Pr[Entryirt = 1] = β1FYi,t−1 + {FE}+ virt,
where FYi,t−1 indicates whether the firm’s export experience started at t−1 (i.e., whether t is firm
i’s second year as an exporter). We include a wide range of fixed eﬀects here as well. Coeﬃcient
β1 indicates whether fledgling exporters are more or less likely to enter new destinations than
experienced exporters.
Results with diﬀerent sets of fixed eﬀects are presented in columns 1-3 of Table 3. FYi,t−1 has a
positive and highly significant coeﬃcient in all three specifications. The magnitudes may look small
at first, but recall that they reflect entry in a given region in a given year, so the entry we consider
is a rather specific event. We find that the probability of entering an “average” destination in an
“average” year is around one percentage point higher if the firm is a new exporter. This compares
with an overall average probability of 7% of entering a new foreign region.
13We experimented with alternative groupings of destinations; they yield qualitatively equivalent results. Similarly,
notice that our grouping of countries in regions implies that when a firm enters a new country in a region r where
it already exports, this is not coded as entry. Considering entry/non-entry within the region does not make an
important diﬀerence to the results either.
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Again, this may be explainable by credit constraints. For example, if firms face liquidity con-
straints at entry, then the inability of either financing sunk entry costs internally or of obtaining
the necessary external credit could force some firms to enter foreign markets sequentially when
they would prefer to enter them simultaneously. Employing a panel of bilateral exports at the
industry level, Manova (2008) finds that credit constraints are indeed important determinants of
export participation. Similarly, Muuls (2009) finds that credit constraints make Belgian exporters
less likely to expand to other foreign destinations. Since credit constraints may be correlated with
being a new exporter, we need to check whether they are driving our results. Column 4 shows the
results when we exclude the firms in the sectors more likely to be credit constrained according to
Manova’s measure. Results are unchanged.
Table 3: Probability of Exporting to a New Market
Dependent Variable: Entryirt Entryirt Entryirt Entryirt Entryirt Entryirt Entryirt D(ND)it
LPM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
FYi,t−1 .008** .015** .009** .009** .009** .009** .006** .048**
(.001) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.004) (.002) (.002) (.010)
logXi,t−1 -.001*
(.0001)
∆logXi,−r,t .006** .052**
(.001) (.003)
∆logXi,−r,t × FYi,t−1 -.005** -.043**
(.002) (.008)
NArgExpkr,t−1 .095**
(.009)
∆logXArgExpkrt .004**
(.001)
Tests:
FYi,t−1 + (∆logXi,−r,t × FYi,t−1)× .10 = 0 5.25
[.002]
FYi,t−1 + (∆logXi,−r,t × FYi,t−1)× .08 = 0 19.80
[.0001]
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes
Year-Destination FE yes yes yes yes yes
Credit-constrained sectors no
Number of obs 235693 235693 235693 87892 227769 235693 220335 29760
R-squared .0002 .08 .09 .09 .10 .09 .10 .32
**: significant at 1%; *: significant at 5%
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms. P-values in square brackets.
Another possibility is that FY is just picking up the eﬀects of within-industry learning, as for
example in Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) or Krautheim (2008). That is, firms may use the entry
of domestic rivals in foreign markets as a signal of their own odds of success as exporters.14 To
14The idea of learning from the experience of others in foreign markets extends also to the product extensive margin
(Iacovone and Javorcik 2010), as well as to decisions beyond exporting, such as foreign direct investments (Lin and
Saggi 1999).
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consider this possibility, we estimate the following expanded specification of our entry regression:
Pr[Entryirt = 1] = β1FYi,t−1 + β2NArgExpkr,t−1 + β3∆logX(ArgExpkrt) + {FE}+ ξijt,
where NArgExpkr,t−1 is the number of Argentine exporters (measured in thousands) in industry
k selling to region r at t − 1 and ∆logX(ArgExpkrt) is the export growth to r of these same
competitors between t and t − 1. These variables control, respectively, for static and dynamic
characteristics of export profitability that a firm may infer from observing its rivals. Column 5
displays the results. Consistently with within-industry learning eﬀects, the number and the growth
rates of domestic competitors in a given destination help to explain entry there. Nevertheless, the
result that a new exporter is more likely to enter a new destination than an experienced exporter
remains unchanged.
Now, although we control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity by using firm fixed eﬀects,
it could be that firms’ extensive margin expansion in their early years as exporters simply reflects
positive idiosyncratic productivity shocks that induced them to start exporting in the first place.
As before, we can control for persistent shocks by including the firm’s lagged export level. As
shown in column 6, the eﬀect of FYi,t−1 withstands this control. Moreover, since idiosyncratic
productivity shocks would induce expansion at both intensive and extensive margins, we can also
control for them by introducing intensive margin export growth (in the current destinations), by
itself and interacted with our indicator for new exporters, FYi,t−1:
Pr[Entryirt = 1] = β1FYi,t−1 + β2∆logXi,−r,t + β3 [∆logXi,−r,t × FYi,t−1] + {FE}+ ηirt.
The results are displayed in column 7. The coeﬃcient of FYi,t−1 remains positive and significant.
But we want to check whether being a new exporter matters for subsequent entry also among the
firms expanding at the intensive margin. The relevant comparison is between new and old exporters
growing at the same rate g. A fledgling exporter growing at rate g is more likely to enter a new
destination than an experienced exporter growing at same rate if β1 + β3g > 0. At the point
estimates, this condition is equivalent to g < 1.2. Close to 97% of the observations satisfy this
condition. At the sample median, g = .10, this sum is positive and highly statistically significant,
as the F-test shows.
Finally, in column 8 we run a diﬀerent regression, where we simply look at whether a surviving
exporter increased its number of foreign destinations (in which case D(ND)it = 1). This regression
has the disadvantage of treating all destinations equally. On the other hand, it considers entry in
each of the 130 individual markets in the sample. We find that new exporters are 4.8 percentage
points more likely to expand the number of markets they serve than experienced ones. This is near a
fifth of the overall (unconstrained) probability that a surviving exporter will expand the number of
destinations it serves, 22%. As we also include intensive-margin growth in the regression, the point
estimates indicate that a new exporter growing at rate g is more likely to add a new destination
than an experienced exporter growing at the same rate if g < 1.12. At the sample median of
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g = .08, the F-test shows that this condition is easily satisfied.
3.4 Exit
We turn now to the exit patterns of exporting firms. Our model predicts that the probability that
firm i will exit a particular export market j in period t (Exitijt = 1) is higher if the firm exported
for the first time in t− 1:
Prediction 3 New exporters are more likely to exit than experienced exporters, including those
that are new in a market but have export experience elsewhere.
To test this prediction, we estimate the following equation:
Pr[Exitijt = 1] = γ1(FYij,t−1 × FMij) + γ2FMij + γ3FYij,t−1 + {FE}+ ζijt.
Coeﬃcient γ1 indicates whether the exit behavior of fledgling exporters is diﬀerent from the behavior
of older exporters. The sample consists of all exporting firms. Again, we introduce fixed eﬀects
to account for country and year specific factors that aﬀect exit. Firm fixed eﬀects, on the other
hand, are not appropriate for the exit regressions, since we want to identify the behavior of single-
year exporters. As most single-year exporters represent only one observation in our data set,
they are excluded when we focus on within-firm variation. The only cases of single-year exporters
that remain after controlling for firm fixed eﬀects are re-entrant single-year exporters (firms that
exported prior but not at t−2, and exited after exporting again at t−1) or simultaneous single-year
exporters (those that broke simultaneously into more than one market in t − 1 and exited in t).
But as we show in the next subsection, the behavior of those types of exporters is very diﬀerent.
Table 4 shows the results. Observe first that, in all estimations without firm fixed eﬀects
(columns 1-3 and 6-7), the coeﬃcients associated with FYij,t−1 and FMij are positive and sig-
nificant, indicating that in general exit from a market is more likely in a firm’s first market and
in its early periods of operation in a market. More importantly, the coeﬃcient of the interaction
FYij,t−1×FMij is also positive and significant in those regressions, confirming that exit rates from
a market are highest for fledgling exporters. Magnitudes are also economically significant. Being
a fledgling exporter increases the probability of exiting a market by almost 29 percentage points
relative to an exporter with experience and in a market other than its first, by 15 percentage points
relative to an experienced exporter operating in its first foreign market, and by over 26 percentage
points relative to an experienced exporter that has just entered an additional market. These figures
compare with an overall average probability of 7% of exiting a market in a certain year.
Once firm fixed eﬀects are introduced (columns 4 and 5), the sign of the interaction (and of
FYij,t−1) shifts to negative. This shows that the exit patterns of firms that re-start to export or
start exporting in more than one market simultaneously are indeed very diﬀerent from those of the
firms that start with a single market. Specifically, new simultaneous exporters and re-entrants are,
jointly, less likely to exit than continuing exporters.
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Table 4: Probability of Exit (Dependent Variable: Exitijt)
LPM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
FYij,t−1 × FMij .122** .121** .125** -.199** -.197** .123** .137**
(.004) (.006) (.006) (.003) (.003) (.008) (.004)
FMij .154** .149** .138** -.015** -.017** .133** .125**
(.003) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.003) (.006) (.006)
FYij,t−1 .017** .015** .025** -.011** -.013** .021** .025**
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.001)
logXi,t−1 -.002**
(.0002)
Firm FE yes yes
Sector FE yes yes yes yes
Year-Destination FE yes yes yes yes
Credit-constrained sectors no
Number of obs 119610 119610 119610 119610 119610 71349 119610
R-squared .13 .14 .15 .69 .70 .15 .15
**: significant at 1%; *: significant at 5%
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
In column 6 we exclude firms from sectors likely to be credit constrained. Estimates are virtually
unchanged from those in columns 1-3. In column 7 we control for firms’ lagged export levels, since
low sales in a year may suggest a low expectation of survival. This is indeed what we find. There
is however little change in the coeﬃcient of FYij,t−1×FMij . If we interpret a firm’s lagged export
levels as a proxy for firm size previous to entry, the results in column 7 imply a hazard rate
decreasing in export tenure, controlling for firm size.
3.5 Re-entrants, Simultaneous Exporters, Homogeneous Products
As discussed in the previous section, we expect the diﬀerential eﬀect between new and old exporters
to be less pronounced for firms that are re-starting to export (and therefore are not really “new”
exporters), for those that start selling to multiple foreign markets (which according to our model
should be more optimistic about their export profitability), and for those that sell homogeneous
goods (and are likely to face less uncertainty ex ante).
Since we cannot spot all re-entrants (i.e. some firms that we identify as “true” new exporters
may have exported before 2002, the first year of our sample), in the previous regressions we treat
all firms that export at t but not at t − 1 as new exporters.15 But we can also test explicitly for
diﬀerential eﬀects between “true” new exporters and the firms that we can identify as re-entrants.
To do so, we re-run the main regressions on intensive margin, entry and exit restricting the sample
to those firms that we can identify as re-entrants. We also run the main regressions restricting the
sample to the firms that start to export in more than one country. Further, we run the regressions
again by restricting the sample to homogeneous products; we follow Rauch’s (1999) “conservative”
classification to define a good as homogeneous. Finally, we re-run the regressions excluding all the
15Observations associated with the activities of identified re-entrants range from 2% to 6% of the observations in
the diﬀerent samples.
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observations included in the previous “special” samples. We denote the firms in that sample by
“SqExp.” We add year-destination fixed eﬀects in all regressions, sector fixed eﬀects in the exit
regression, and firm fixed eﬀects in the intensive margin and entry regressions.
Table 5 displays the results for the intensive margin growth. First year-first market growth is
not especially higher for any of the three special groups, but it is for the SqExp firms. Simultaneous
and homogeneous goods exporters do grow faster early in a market, but this growth is not diﬀerent
in the first market relative to subsequent markets.
Table 5: Intensive Margin Growth (Dependent Variable: ∆ logXijt)
Re-entrants Simultaneous Homogenous SqExp
FYij,t−1 × FMij .136 .034 -.008 .214**
(.168) (.091) (.155) (.051)
FMij -.405** -.029 .088 .017
(.140) (.069) (.155) (.051)
FYij,t−1 -.031 .249** .352** .226**
(.154) (.075) (.049) (.017)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Year-Destination FE yes yes yes yes
Number of obs 5029 9220 9226 87202
R-squared .436 .285 .118 .009
**: significant at 1%; *: significant at 5%
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
‘Re-entrants’ are firms that export in year t, having exported also previously to t− 1 but not in t− 1.
‘Simultaneous’ are firms that sell to more than one foreign destination in their first year of exporting.
‘Homogenous’ are firms that sell homogenous goods according to Rauch’s (1999) classification.
‘SqExp’ encompasses the firms not included in the other categories.
Table 6 shows the results for the entry regressions. Only the SqExp firms display a distinguish-
ably higher probability of entering a diﬀerent region right after its first year as exporter.
Table 6: Probability of Exporting to a New Market (Dependent Variable: Entryirt)
Re-entrants Simultaneous Homogenous SqExp
FYi,t−1 -.061* .001 .012 .012**
(.031) (.007) (.008) (.002)
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Year-Destination FE yes yes yes yes
Number of obs 6884 21564 13844 196389
R-squared .17 .15 .08 .09
**: significant at 1%; *: significant at 5%
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
‘Re-entrants’ are firms that export in year t, having exported also previously to t− 1 but not in t− 1.
‘Simultaneous’ are firms that sell to more than one foreign destination in their first year of exporting.
‘Homogenous’ are firms that sell homogenous goods according to Rauch’s (1999) classification.
‘SqExp’ encompasses the firms not included in the other categories.
Table 7 presents the exit regressions. First year-first market exit rates are especially high for
the SqExp firms and also for producers of homogeneous goods; the eﬀect is however twice as large
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for the former. For simultaneous exporters, the interaction term is also positive and significant.
However, the coeﬃcients of FM and FY are themselves negative and significant, and of a magnitude
similar to the coeﬃcient of the interaction term. Thus, for firms in their first market, the additional
eﬀect on exit rates from being in the first year is given by the sum of the coeﬃcients on FY and
FM × FY , which is indistinguishable from zero. The same is true for the additional eﬀect from
being in the first market for firms that are new in a market.
Table 7: Probability of Exit (Dependent Variable: Exitijt)
Re-entrants Simultaneous Homogenous SqExp
FYij,t−1 × FMij .032 .233** .123** .247**
(.106) (.042) (.017) (.007))
FMij -.125 -.217** .124** .138**
(.108) (.045) (.024) (.005)
FYij,t−1 -.101 -.239** .010** .022**
(.107) (.043) (.004) (.001)
Sector FE yes yes yes yes
Year-Destination FE yes yes yes yes
Number of obs 1849 7014 9637 102731
R-squared .16 .07 .16 .19
**: significant at 1%; *: significant at 5%
Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters in firms.
‘Re-entrants’ are firms that export in year t, having exported also previously to t− 1 but not in t− 1.
‘Simultaneous’ are firms that sell to more than one foreign destination in their first year of exporting.
‘Homogenous’ are firms that sell homogenous goods according to Rauch’s (1999) classification.
‘SqExp’ encompasses the firms not included in the other categories.
In sum, re-entrants are neither more likely to grow if they survive, nor more likely to exit right
after re-entering their first market, than later in their export experience. Neither are they more
likely to expand to diﬀerent regions right after re-starting foreign sales than later. Being new does
not matter for the dynamic pattern of firms that start selling in multiple markets either. The same
is true for producers of homogeneous goods except for their exit rates, which are higher upon entry
than later in their export experience. This diﬀerential eﬀect for new exporters of homogeneous
products is nevertheless not as high as it is for the SqExp group of firms.
An alternative way to check for the diﬀerential eﬀects is to interact dummy variables for each
subsample with our key covariates in the growth, entry and exit regressions. This allows us to
compare the relative strength of sequential exporting behavior in each group relative to the reference
group of all experienced exporters. The results from this exercise are, on the whole, similar to those
reported here. They are available in a previous working paper version of this article (Albornoz et
al. 2010, section 3.3).
3.6 Other robustness checks
We have also run additional regressions to check whether the results we obtain are driven by some
omitted variable correlated with FM or FY . These are as follows. (i) We exclude exports of
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“samples,” defined as yearly transactions of less than $1000, to see whether our results are driven
by very small exporters.16 (ii) We re-define “initial experience” more liberally, setting FY = 1
for the first two years of exporting. (iii) We employ diﬀerent adjustments of robust standard
errors, like clustering in destinations and firm-destinations. (iv)We use lagged exports to the same
destination (Xij,t−1) instead of lagged total exports (Xi,t−1) to control for size in the growth and
exit regressions. None of the results from those alternative specifications change our main messages
in an important way. We also test whether experience in the second year is relevant. We find that
the coeﬃcients associated with FYij,t−2 × FMij , for the intensive margin and exit, or FYi,t−1, for
entry, are either insignificant or considerably smaller than the equivalent for the first year. This
suggests that learning takes place mostly in the first year. These robustness checks are unreported
to save space but available upon request.
3.7 Alternative mechanisms
Our empirical analysis strongly supports the qualitative predictions from our model. The plausi-
bility of our mechanism is also in harmony with case study evidence on firms starting to export.
While there are (obviously) other forces that shape the dynamic behavior of exporting firms, we are
unaware of alternative theoretical models that could deliver this set of predictions without adopting
the key element of our mechanism, namely export profitabilities at the firm level that are ex ante
uncertain but correlated over time and across destinations.
There are forces that could explain some of the empirical findings we uncover. The diﬃculty
is in finding a single mechanism that generates the dynamic patterns in all the three margins we
explore. Consider for example that not uncertainty, but binding capacity constraints are the key
behind the empirical findings we obtain. If a firm faced binding capacity constraints as it entered
foreign markets, but capacity could be expanded disproportionately within a year, intensive-margin
growth and the probability of expansion to other markets would indeed be disproportionately high in
the second year. However, high early exit would remain puzzling, as survival should not depend on
(sunk) capacity-building costs. Likewise, a “learning-by-exporting” process by which an exporter’s
productivity improves with exposure to foreign competition would be compatible with high early
intensive-margin growth, provided that most learning takes place in the initial period of foreign
activities. A learning-by-exporting process is, however, also diﬃcult to reconcile with our findings
about high early exit.17
Similarly, the firm fixed eﬀects that we use in the intensive margin and entry regressions imply
that there is more to the dynamics of new exporters than deterministic productivity diﬀerences in
level or trend, but they cannot account for idiosyncratic firm productivity shocks. We attempt to
control for time-varying idiosyncratic shocks by adding firms’ lagged export volumes and lagged
export growth. Still, it is arguable that these proxies do not capture time-varying, firm-specific
16We also try $2000 and $3000 as alternative thresholds.
17Since the evidence on learning from exporting indicates that, if it exists, it is likely to be specific to the destination
market (see the survey by Wagner 2007), such a mechanism would also be unable to explain why fledgling exporters
are more likely to enter new markets than experienced exporters.
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shocks fully. If so, it would be conceivable that the portion of the autocorrelated productivity shocks
not captured by our proxies may explain why intensive-margin growth and the probability of entry
in new destinations are especially high in the early periods of exporting. However,as pointed out
by Ruhl and Willis (2008), models with sunk export costs and persistent TFP shocks predict that
the hazard rate out of exporting increases with export tenure, as serially correlated shocks die out
over time. We find that the opposite is true, when firms break into a new foreign market18 and
especially in their first export destinations.19
Still, these findings would not be inconsistent with stochastic productivity advances, as Arko-
lakis and Papageorgiou (2010) show in current work in progress. Their goal is to explain how
age, conditional on size, aﬀects firm dynamics in a closed economy. They allow TFP to follow
a first-order Markov process, but firms can uncover their demand parameter only by producing,
as in Jovanovic (1982). This assumption is crucial to generate growth and exit hazard rates that
decline with age, controlling for size. In a multi-market setting like ours, it would be tantamount
to assuming that a firm has to export to gauge its export profitability.
Another possibility is that firms develop “global reputations.” This could be studied, for ex-
ample, in a framework that extends partnership models like Rauch and Watson’s (2003) or Araujo
and Ornelas’ (2007) to a multi-market context. The key element would be that exporters’ activities
across markets need to become public information to all distributors globally. If this process took
place within a short period of time after the first export incursion, then such a model could proba-
bly deliver empirical regularities similar to the ones we obtain. If, however, global reputation took
longer to build than a single year, this would not be the main force driving our empirical findings.
4 Trade Policy Implications
Our empirical analysis strongly suggests that correlation of firms’ export profitabilities over time
and across destinations is an important ingredient of firms’ export decisions. Does that matter?
Should we care? We argue that we should. In addition to providing new insights on firms’ decisions
to export and their dynamic behavior in foreign markets, the mechanism we propose also implies
that the impact of trade policy on trade flows is more nuanced (and potentially much larger) than
standard trade theories suggest. This opens new perspectives from which we can understand and
assess the benefits of trade policy coordination across countries, as in regional and multilateral
trade agreements. Our mechanism also uncovers dynamic eﬀects of trade policy, which have been
relatively neglected by researchers. To make these contributions clear, we examine the eﬀects of
trade liberalization in a simple extension of the model that includes many firms/sectors.
Consider a continuum of total mass one of firms with heterogeneous sunk costs of exporting,
F . Let F follow a continuous c.d.f. H(F ) on the support [0,∞). As before, for each firm ex ante
18As in previous studies focusing on the hazard rates out of exporting, such as Besedes and Prusa (2006).
19Recent stochastic models of export dynamics without sunk export costs, such as Arkolakis (2009) or Irrarazabal
and Opromolla (2009), fail to generate some of our empirical findings, too. In particular, in those models the growth
rate and the hazard rate need not decrease with age, once size is controlled for.
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profitability follows G(μ). Let h(·) and g(·) denote the p.d.f.s of H(·) and G(·), respectively. We
assume that F and μ are independently distributed. Assuming independence is analytically very
convenient. In particular, it implies an equivalence between having a single firm (as in the basic
model) and a continuum of monopolists.
The number of potential firms in Home is exogenous and normalized to one. The total number
of exporters to market j = A,B in period t = 1, 2, M jt , follows from Proposition 1:
• MA1 = H
£
FSq(τA, τB)
¤
firms export to market A at t = 1;
• MB1 = H
£
FSm(τB)
¤
of firms export to market B at t = 1;
• MA2 = H
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¤ £
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of firms export to market A at t = 2, all of which already
exported to A at t = 1;
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i
dH(F ) firms export to market
B at t = 2. The first term corresponds to continuing exporters, the second to entrants;
• 1−H £FSq(τA, τB)¤ firms do not export.
Quantities sold in markets j = A,B at t = 1 follow bqj1, as defined in expressions (6) and (7).
sold at t = 2 by new and old exporters follow the expressions developed in subsection 2.2.1.
Let us then look at the eﬀects of a t = 1 permanent decrease in trade cost τ j on export levels.
Consider first the intensive margin. Clearly, a fall in τA increases sales of current exporters to
A at t = 1 without aﬀecting sales to B, while a fall in τB has symmetric immediate eﬀects. At
t = 2, export levels rise for surviving exporters. This is counterbalanced by a negative composition
eﬀect: the new entrants benefiting from lower trade costs operate at a lower-than-average scale.
The overall intensive margin eﬀect is therefore generally ambiguous.20
The most interesting and novel features of the model regard however the extensive margin
eﬀects of trade liberalization. As a first step, we determine how variable trade costs aﬀect the entry
thresholds FSm(τB) and FSq(τA, τB).
Lemma 1 Variable trade costs in markets A and B aﬀect the sunk cost thresholds as follows:
• dFSmdτA = 0;
• dFSmdτB = −1{Eμ>τB}

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τB

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2

dG(μ)
G(2[FSm]1/2+τB)
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20Lawless (2010) shows that both eﬀects exactly oﬀset each other in a heterogeneous firms’ model a la Melitz
(2003) whenever export sales follow a Pareto distribution. She finds ambiguous intensive margin eﬀects of trade cost
reductions in empirical work on U.S. firms’ exports.
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We can now establish the extensive margin eﬀects of trade liberalization in countries A and B
in both the short and the long runs.
Proposition 3 Trade liberalization in a country has qualitatively diﬀerent eﬀects on entry in the
short and long runs, and encourages entry in other countries. Specifically:
a) A decrease in τA at t = 1, holding τB fixed:
1. increases the number of Home exporters to A at t = 1 and at t = 2;
2. has no eﬀect on Home exports to B at t = 1, but increases the number of Home exporters to
B at t = 2.
b) A decrease in τB at t = 1, holding τA fixed and such that τB remains larger than τA:
1. increases the number of Home exporters to A at t = 1 and t = 2;
2. increases the number of Home exporters to B at t = 1 and t = 2.
Proposition 3 has three startling elements. First, it shows that trade liberalization has im-
mediate as well as delayed eﬀects on trade flows. This distinction is especially important given
economists’ typical focus on the static gains from trade; our analysis indicates that we should not
disregard lagged responses of trade flows to trade barriers. Second, the Proposition shows that
trade liberalization in a country induces entry into other countries. Third, it shows that this in-
duced entry in other markets is always present in the long run, but not necessarily in the short
run.
To see this more intuitively, consider first the short run. A lower τA makes early entry in
market A more appealing, as expected, but so does a lower τB, because it increases the profits from
potentially entering market B at t = 2. By contrast, while τB directly aﬀects the decision to enter
market B at t = 1, τA plays no direct role in that decision. The reason is that the choice between
entering markets sequentially or simultaneously is unaﬀected by τA. Conversely, in the long run
there is no asymmetry and cross-market eﬀects are always present. As variable trade costs fall,
firms’ potential future gains from learning their export profitabilities increase. As a result, more
firms choose to engage in exporting. Among those new exporters, a fraction will find it profitable
to enter other destinations in the future.
Hence, Proposition 3 implies that trade liberalization in a country creates trade externalities to
other countries. From the perspective of Argentine firms, for example, this means that events such
as the opening of the Chinese market since the late 1990s may have induced some firms to start
exporting to Argentina’s neighbors: even though trade policy in those countries have changed little
in the last ten years, the better prospect of serving the Chinese market increases the attractiveness
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of experimenting as exporters, and nearby markets could serve that role. Similarly, the formation
of Mercosur in 1991 may have been responsible for the subsequent entry of some Argentine firms
in North American or European markets, as they realized their export potential by serving the
Mercosur partners.
The Mercosur example also highlights the fact that the consequences of trade agreements could
be very diﬀerent from what existing studies suggest. Specifically, an RTA will tend to spawn an
extensive margin trade creation eﬀect–and one that involves third countries. That is, even from
a purely partial equilibrium perspective, regional integration can create trade with non-partner
countries for reasons that are entirely diﬀerent from those emphasized in the existing literature,
and involving not greater imports, but enhanced exports to non-members. Naturally, empirical
research focused on this eﬀect is necessary to gather its practical relevance.21
It is also important to note that our structure abstracts from several channels through which
trade liberalization can aﬀect firms (e.g. by changing the number of active firms), some of which
may interact with the forces we highlight here. Still, as long as sequential entry remains optimal
for some firms, the nature of our main policy implications would not be qualitatively altered.
5 Conclusion
Using data on Argentine exports at the firm-destination-year level, we find that, entry sunk costs
notwithstanding, many of the firms that start exporting drop out of the export business very shortly.
By contrast, the successful ones grow at both the intensive and the extensive margins. We refer to
this empirical pattern as “sequential exporting.” This pattern is not generally observed, however,
when firms re-start exporting after a break, or among firms that start exporting simultaneously to
multiple markets, or among exporters of homogeneous goods.
While rich in several dimensions, recent trade models based on selection due to heterogeneity in
productivity and export sunk costs are often ill-equipped to address these dynamic patterns. Here
we argue that export profit idiosyncratic uncertainty and the role of self-discovery are also key
ingredients to firms’ export dynamics.22 We develop what is perhaps the simplest model that can
21Our data set does not permit such an evaluation because Argentina has not entered in any RTA since Mercosur,
which came into force eleven years before our sample starts. However, two recent empirical papers find that RTAs
are indeed very conducive of sequential exporting. Borchert (2009) finds that the growth of Mexican exports to
Latin America from 1993–right before NAFTA came into force–to 1997 is higher, the greater the reduction in
the preferential U.S. tariﬀ under NAFTA for that product. Moreover, and critically, this eﬀect comes entirely from
changes in the extensive margin. Similarly, using trade data for 36 countries at the 5-digit level and eleven RTAs
over an 11-year window, Molina (2010) identifies a strong positive eﬀect of RTAs in promoting exports of products
first sold to RTA partners as a result of intra-bloc liberalization to countries outside the bloc. While most existing
trade models would find it diﬃcult to explain these findings, they correspond to a direct implication of our model.
A related study by Molina, Bussolo and Iacovone (2010) on the extensive margin eﬀects of the accession of the
Dominican Republic to the Central American Free Trade Agreements, which includes the U.S., is also in line with
RTAs playing a decisive role in boosting firms’ incentives to experiment in foreign markets. They document a sharp
increase in the number of exporting firms from the Dominican Republic to the bloc partners immediately after the
agreement took eﬀect, followed by a sharp increase in exit in the subsequent year.
22A step towards integrating some of our insights within a heterogeneous productivity framework has been under-
taken by Arkolakis and Papageorgiou (2010) in current work in progress.
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address the implications of this mechanism. A firm discovers its profitability as an exporter only
after exporting takes place. The firm conditions the decision to serve other destinations on this
information. Since breaking into new markets entails unrecoverable costs and export profitability
has global scope, the firm has an incentive to enter foreign destinations sequentially. For example,
neighboring markets can serve as “testing grounds” for future expansions to larger or more distant
markets.
This mechanism has far-reaching implications for trade policy. First, it implies a trade exter-
nality : exports to a country could increase because other countries have liberalized trade, thereby
making experimentation in foreign markets more profitable. As a result, quantitative assessments of
major proposals for multilateral liberalization, like those discussed under the current Doha Round
of negotiations in the World Trade Organization, could greatly understate their impact on trade
flows, since they do not account for lagged and third-country eﬀects on firms’ export decisions.
The same is true for studies seeking to evaluate the historical eﬀectiveness of the GATT/WTO
system in promoting trade (e.g. Rose 2004). Furthermore, and although our model is not designed
for normative analysis, it seems clear that the trade externality we uncover reinforces the need for
multilateral coordination of trade policies across countries.23
Similar implications apply to the more limited–but much more widespread–arrangements of
liberalization at the regional level. Regional liberalization raises the number of firms willing to
experiment with intra-regional exports. Eventually, some of those firms choose to break into extra-
regional markets as well. This lagged trade-creation eﬀect toward non-members corresponds to an
implication of regional trade agreements that the literature has so far entirely neglected.
Notice, on the other hand, that the trade externality by itself does not warrant export promotion
policies. One may be led to think that, because entry in one foreign market can lead to future entry
in other destinations, governments may play a positive role in this process by enacting policies that
induce domestic firms to start exporting. But this need not be the case if individual firms take
all the benefits related to their future export performance into account when deciding whether to
become an exporter. Naturally, if the government had access to a better technology to acquire and
disseminate information than those available to the private sector, then there could be a role for
export promotion policies.24 Similarly, if there were market ineﬃciencies–e.g. credit constraints
that prevent willing domestic firms from entering foreign markets–then their interaction with our
proposed mechanism could provide a role for public intervention. But such market ineﬃciencies
alone may already justify active trade policies at the national level, even in the absence of sequential
exporting. A careful assessment of such issues would nevertheless require a fully specified general
equilibrium model. This is beyond the scope of this paper, but future research building on our
framework could deliver important insights for the design of national trade policies.
23None of the existing explanations for multilateral trade cooperation–based on terms of trade eﬀects (Bagwell
and Staiger 1999), commitment motives (Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 2007), production relocation externalities (Ossa
2009), strategic uncertainty (Calvo-Pardo 2009), or profit-shifting motives (Mrazova 2010)–accounts for the sequen-
tiality of firms’ export strategies.
24Lederman, Olarreaga and Payton (2010) provide suggestive evidence that this may be the case.
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Sequential exporting strategies could also help to rationalize some empirical findings from the
trade literature, such as the apparent excess sensitivity of trade flows to changes in trade barriers
(Yi 2003) and the greater sensitivity of trade flows to trade costs at the extensive relative to
the intensive margin (Bernard et al. 2007, Mayer and Ottaviano 2007). Similarly, the sequential
exporting process hints that the gains from trade may extend well beyond the static gains typically
emphasized in the literature. However, for a thorough evaluation of the implications of sequential
exporting for these issues, a more general theoretical structure would be required.
A distinct but equally promising avenue for future research is in exploring the mechanism we
lay out in this paper at a more disaggregated level, seeking to identify the types of products, or
the sectors, as well as the characteristics of foreign markets, for which the process of sequential
exporting is more relevant.25 For example, it would be very interesting to evaluate whether there
is a dynamic counterpart to the hierarchy of markets uncovered by Eaton et al. (2010). They find
that distant, diﬃcult markets are accessed solely by the highly productive firms; is it also true that
those firms sell to diﬃcult markets only later in their internationalization process? To focus on
the basic mechanism we abstract from these issues here, taking instead the extreme view that the
correlation of export profitabilities across destinations is the same for all sectors and for all pairs
of countries. Undeniably, this is a crude approximation. In reality, we should observe instead a
matrix of correlations across countries for each sector. Exploring the structure of those matrices is
beyond the scope of this paper, but it could prove very useful, making it possible to fine tune the
analysis of firms’ export strategies and of the impact of trade policies. We look forward to advances
in those areas.26
6 Appendices
6.1 Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Rewrite condition (16) for eB1 = 1 as
F +W (τB;F ) < Ψ(τB). (17)
25Alternatively, one could study the sequentiality of a firm’s entry modes in a foreign market. This is the approach
followed by Conconi et al. (2010) in recent work, where they modify our framework to study whether exporting to a
market serves as a testing ground for a firm’s (potential) future foreign direct investment in that market.
26Three recent papers provide some initial steps in this direction. Using our data set and empirical methodology,
Elliott and Tian (2010) evaluate the patterns of sequential exporting of Argentine firms in Asia. They find that China
serves as the main stepping stone for entry in the ten members of the ASEAN free trade bloc. Japan also plays such
a role, but the eﬀect is smaller, while entry in Europe and in the U.S. does not foster subsequent entry in ASEAN.
Defever et al. (2010) generalize our setup to a spatial model to study the geographic spread of Chinese exports
between 2003 and 2005. They find a positive correlation in unobserved firm profits across neighboring countries, even
after controlling for firm productivity. Morales et al. (2010) develop a novel structure based on a moment inequalities
approach to estimate firms’ fixed and sunk costs of accessing foreign country i after having sold in a diﬀerent foreign
country j. This path-dependence, which the authors refer to as "extended gravity" factors, matters if a firm’s export
profitability is correlated across markets (in their model through correlation in costs). Looking at chemical firms
from Chile and focusing on proximity and on the similarity of GDPs and language, Morales et al. find that extended
gravity factors play indeed an important role in explaining entry in foreign markets.
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The right-hand side of (17) is independent of F , whereas the left-hand side is strictly increasing in
F . To see that, use Leibniz’s rule to find that
∂
£
F +W (τB;F )
¤
∂F
= 1−
Z μ
2F 1/2+τB
dG(μ)
= G(2F 1/2 + τB) > 0. (18)
Defining FSm as the F that would turn (17) into an equality, eB1 = 1 if F < F
Sm. However,
FSm = 0 if Eμ ≤ τB, since in that case (17) becomes
F +
Z μ
2F 1/2+τB
"µ
μ− τB
2
¶2
− F
#
dG(μ) <
Z μ
τB
µ
μ− τB
2
¶2
dG(μ).
This expression becomes an equality when F = 0. Given (18), it follows that it does not hold for
any F > 0.
Next rewrite condition (15) for eA1 = 1 as
F −W (τB;F ) ≤ Ψ(τA). (19)
The right-hand side of (19) is independent of F , whereas it is straightforward to see that the left-
hand side is strictly increasing in F . Thus, defining FSq as the F that solves (19) with equality,
eA1 = 1 if F ≤ FSq. Since FSm is the value of F that leaves the firm indiﬀerent between a sequential
and a simultaneous entry strategy [i.e. ΠSq(FSm) = ΠSm(FSm) > 0], while FSq is the value of F
that leaves the firm indiﬀerent between sequential entry and no entry [i.e. ΠSq(FSq) = 0], because
profits are decreasing in the value of the sunk entry cost, ∂ΠSq(F )/∂F = G(2F 1/2 + τB)− 2 < 0,
it follows that FSq > FSm.
Finally, since the firm learns μ at t = 1 when F ∈ [FSm, FSq], it enters market B at t = 2
according to (4).
Proof of Proposition 2. Rewrite condition (16) for eB1 = 1 as
F < Ψ(τB +
1
ϕ
)−W (τB + 1
ϕ
;F ). (20)
Analogously to Proposition 1, FSm = 0 if Eμ ≤ τB + 1ϕ , in which case
dFSm
dϕ = 0. Otherwise, the
expression above rewritten as an equality defines FSm implicitly:
FSm =
∙
Ψ(τB +
1
ϕ
)−W (τB + 1
ϕ
;FSm)
¸
,
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or equivalently,
FSm =
Ã
Eμ− τB − 1ϕ
2
!2
+
Z μ
τB+ 1ϕ
Ã
μ− τB − 1ϕ
2
!2
dG(μ)
−
Z μ
2(FSm)1/2+τB+ 1ϕ
⎡
⎣
Ã
μ− τB − 1ϕ
2
!2
− FSm
⎤
⎦ dG(μ).
Totally diﬀerentiating this expression and manipulating it, we find
dFSm
dϕ
=
∂Ψ(τB + 1ϕ)/∂ϕ− ∂W (τB +
1
ϕ ;F
Sm)/∂ϕ
1 + ∂W (τB + 1ϕ ;F
Sm)/∂F
=
(Eμ− τB − 1ϕ) +
R 2[FSm]1/2+τB+ 1ϕ
τB+ 1ϕ
(μ− τB − 1ϕ)dG(μ)
2ϕ2G(2 [FSm]1/2 + τB + 1ϕ)
> 0.
Next rewrite condition (15) for eA1 = 1 as
F ≤ Ψ(τA + 1
ϕ
) +W (τB +
1
ϕ
;F ). (21)
This expression defines FSq implicitly when it holds with equality:
FSq = Ψ(τA +
1
ϕ
) +W (τB +
1
ϕ
;FSq),
or equivalently,
FSq = 1{Eμ>τA+ 1ϕ}
Ã
Eμ− τA − 1ϕ
2
!2
+
Z μ
τA+ 1ϕ
Ã
μ− τA − 1ϕ
2
!2
dG(μ)
+
Z μ
2(FSq)1/2+τB+ 1ϕ
⎡
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Ã
μ− τB − 1ϕ
2
!2
− FSq
⎤
⎦ dG(μ).
Totally diﬀerentiating this expression and manipulating it, we find
dFSq
dϕ
=
∂Ψ(τA + 1ϕ)/∂ϕ+ ∂W (τ
B + 1ϕ ;F
Sq)/∂ϕ
1− ∂W (τB + 1ϕ ;FSq)/∂F
=
1
2ϕ2
h
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#
> 0,
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completing the proof.
Proof of Lemma 1. Condition (16) for eB1 = 1 defines F
Sm implicitly when it holds with
equality: FSm = 1{Eμ>τB}
£
Ψ(τB)−W (τB;FSm)
¤
. It is straightforward to see that dF
Sm
dτA = 0.
From Proposition 1, we know that FSm = 0 if Eμ ≤ τB, so in that case dFSmdτB = 0 too. If instead
Eμ > τB, then FSm > 0 and we can find dFSm/dτB by applying the implicit function theorem:
dFSm
dτB
= 1{Eμ>τB}
∙
∂Ψ(τB)/∂τB − ∂W (τB;FSm)/∂τB
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2
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⎤
⎥⎦ ≤ 0.
Condition (15) for eA1 = 1 defines F
Sq implicitly when it holds with equality: FSq = Ψ(τA) +
W (τB;FSq). Applying the implicit function theorem to this identity, we obtain
dFSq
dτA
=
∂Ψ(τA)/∂τA
1− ∂W (τB;FSq)/∂F = −
h
1{Eμ>τA}
³
Eμ−τA
2
´
+
R μ
τA
³
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2
´
dG(μ)
i
2−G
³
2 [FSq]1/2 + τB
´ < 0, and
dFSq
dτB
=
∂W (τB;F )/∂τB
1− ∂W (τB;FSq)/∂F = −
hR μ
2[FSq ]1/2+τB
³
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2
´
dG(μ)
i
2−G
³
2 [FSq]1/2 + τB
´ < 0,
completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof follows from the definition of M jt , Lemma 1, and the facts
that H(·) is a non-decreasing function and that both 1−G(τB+2F 12 ) and 1−G(τB) are decreasing
in τB. Diﬀerentiating the M
j
t ’s with respect to both variable trade costs, we obtain:
• dMA1dτj = h(FSq)dF
Sq
dτj < 0, j = A,B;
• dMB1dτA = h(FSm)dF
Sm
dτA = 0;
• dMA2dτA = h(FSq)dF
Sq
dτA
£
1−G(τA)
¤
−H(FSq)g(τA) < 0;
• dMB2dτA = h(FSq)dF
Sq
dτA
h
1−G(2
£
FSq
¤1/2
+ τB)
i
< 0;
• dMB1dτB = h(FSq)dF
Sm
dτB < 0;
• dMA2dτB = h(FSq)dF
Sq
dτB
£
1−G(τA)
¤
< 0.
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To find dM
B
2
dτB , notice that
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which is negative since each of its terms are negative.
6.2 Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics
Argentine manufacturing exports grew by 220% between 2002 and 2007, after the steep depreciation
of its currency in early 2002. However, as Table 8 reveals, export growth was similar in most
industries. The only relevant change in the export structure was an increase in Petroleum’s relative
share (from 23% in 2002 to 30% in 2007) at the expense of the Automotive and Transport industry’s
(17% to 13%).
Table 8: Argentinean Manufacturing Exports by Industry
Industry Exports* Exports* Growth Share Share
2002 2007 (%) 2002 2007
Food, Tobacco and Beverages 4979 10884 119 23 23
Petroleum 4967 13863 179 23 30
Chemicals 1514 3466 129 7 7
Rubber and Plastics 928 1845 99 4 4
Leather and Footwear 829 1144 38 4 2
Wood Products, Pulp and Paper Products 506 998 97 2 2
Textiles and Clothing 533 775 45 2 2
Metal Products, except Machinery 2102 4092 95 10 9
Machinery and Equipment 1127 3137 178 5 7
Automotive and Transport Equipment 3492 5894 69 16 13
Electrical Machinery 385 426 11 2 1
Total Manufacturing 20837 45773 120 100 100
* Million USD
The distribution of export destinations has changed somewhat more significantly during the
sample period. Using the regions defined in subsection 3.3, Table 9 shows a growing importance
of Mercosur after 2003 (receiving 35% of all Argentine exports in 2007) and a decline in the par-
ticipation of Chile and Bolivia, from 17% in 2002 to 10% in 2007. Starting from a low level, the
37
importance of China has increased significantly, having more than doubled its share of Argentine
exports during our sample period, to 7%. Meanwhile North America, non-Mercosur Latin Amer-
ican markets and the European Union have become relatively less important as destinations for
Argentine exports.
Table 9: Argentinean Manufacturing Exports by Region (% of total value)
Region 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Mercosur 32 25 27 28 32 35
Chile-Bolivia 17 18 16 15 13 10
Rest of the World 16 15 17 17 20 20
North America 15 19 17 18 13 13
EU-27 except Spain-Italy 6 6 5 5 5 5
Central America-Mexico 6 6 7 6 7 6
China 3 6 6 5 5 7
Other South America 3 3 3 3 3 3
Spain-Italy 3 3 3 3 2 2
Table 10 displays the share of Argentine exporters that each region receives, in general (columns
DS) and among new exporters (columns FMS). The ratio FMS/DS is a proxy for the relative
importance of the region as a “testing ground” for Argentine exporters. If it is greater than one, it
suggests the region is relatively attractive as a “testing ground.” The table shows that this is the
case for Spain-Italy, Mercosur, North America, Chile-Bolivia and, recently, China.
Table 10: Argentinean Manufacturing First Markets by Region (%)
Region 2003 2007
FMS DS FMS/DS FMS DS FMS/DS
Mercosur 29 24 1.23 36 25 1.44
Chile-Bolivia 20 16 1.26 17 14 1.20
North America 12 9 1.39 9 7 1.32
Spain-Italy 11 7 1.71 8 5 1.45
Rest of the World 8 17 .46 12 20 .61
Central America-Mexico 7 11 .67 4 10 .43
Other South America 7 9 .72 7 10 .69
EU-27 except Spain-Italy 5 7 .74 6 8 .71
China 0 1 .50 2 1 1.52
FMS: share of region j as first export destination by number of firms.
DS: share of region j as export destination by number of firms.
Table 11 reveals some interesting features of diﬀerent types of exporters. First, new exporters–
which correspond to the sum of “entrants” (firms that not do not export in t−1 but do so in both t
and t+1) and “single-year” exporters (i.e. firms that export in t but not in either t−1 or t+1)–are
common in our sample, representing on average 24% of all exporters in a year. Second, many new
exporters are single-year (38% on average) and their share rises over time, reaching 47% of all new
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exporters in 2006. Third, “continuers” (those that export in t− 1, t and t+1) account for the bulk
of exports in Argentina, while entrants and “exiters” (firms that export in t − 1 and in t but not
in t+ 1) are much smaller, and single-year exporters even more so.
Table 11: Exports by Type of Exporter
Number of firms
Year Total Entrant Exiter Continuer Single-Year
2002 7205
2003 8251 1484 499 5520 748
2004 9055 1569 487 6517 482
2005 10884 1568 1053 7033 1230
2006 10944 1244 1230 7371 1099
2007 10062
Total Value of exports (US$ Millions)
Year Total Entrant Exiter Continuer Single-Year
2002 17890
2003 18554 80 299 18183 26
2004 23544 133 34 23369 16
2005 29060 204 161 28603 102
2006 30872 362 127 30405 41
2007 41395
Exports per firm (US$ Thousands)
Year Total Entrant Exiter Continuer Single-Year
2002 2483
2003 2249 54 598 3294 34
2004 2600 85 70 3586 32
2005 2670 130 153 4067 83
2006 2821 291 103 4125 37
2007 4114
Note: "Entrants" in year t are firms that not did not export in t− 1, exported in t, and will export in t+ 1 as well.
"Exiters" exported in t− 1 and in t, but are not exporters in t+ 1. "Continuers" export in t− 1, t and t+ 1.
"Single-Year" exporters are firms that exported in t but neither in t− 1 nor in t+ 1.
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